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Abstract
Previous research suggests that Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) might be associated with impairments on implicit but not 
explicit mentalizing tasks. However, such comparisons are made diicult by the heterogeneity of stimuli and the techniques 
used to measure mentalizing capabilities. We tested the abilities of 34 individuals (17 with ASD) to derive intentions from 
others’ actions during both explicit and implicit tasks and tracked their eye-movements. Adults with ASD displayed explicit 
but not implicit mentalizing deicits. Adults with ASD displayed typical ixation patterns during both implicit and explicit 
tasks. These results illustrate an explicit mentalizing deicit in adults with ASD, which cannot be attributed to diferences 
in ixation patterns.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder · Intentions · Mentalizing · Autistic traits · Action perception · Eye-tracking
Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is the term used in the 
most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) to describe a range of 
neurodevelopmental disorders, classiied according to core 
deicits in social communication and interaction as well as 
restricted and repetitive interests (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013). One of the social communication dii-
culties associated with ASD is diiculty inferring the inter-
nal states of others including their intentions, mental states 
and beliefs (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Chung et al. 2014; 
Frith 2001; Holt et al. 2014a, b; Jollife and Baron-Cohen 
1999a, b), collectively referred to as mentalizing deicits. 
Mentalizing deicits are so strongly associated with ASD 
that mentalizing abilities are even assessed in diagnostic 
and screening tools such as the Autism Diagnostic Obser-
vation Schedule (ADOS-2) and the Autism Quotient (AQ) 
scale (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001; Lord et al. 2000). Due to the 
spectral nature of ASD, individuals without a diagnosis also 
display varying degrees of autistic traits. Individuals with 
relatively high but not clinically signiicant levels of autis-
tic traits have been shown to display subtler versions of the 
behavioural and neurological characteristics associated with 
ASD (Best et al. 2015; Di Martino et al. 2009; Lindell et al. 
2009; Ridley et al. 2011; van Boxtel and Lu 2013) including 
mentalizing deicits (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001; Chung et al. 
2014; Happé 1994; Kana et al. 2014; Moran et al. 2011).
Despite the strong association between ASD and mental-
izing deicits, experimental evidence regarding the nature 
of these deicits is inconsistent, with some studies inding 
that adults with ASD are impaired at inferring intentions, 
emotions and mental states of others (Baron-Cohen et al. 
2001; Castelli et al. 2002; Happé 1994; Kana et al. 2014; 
Moran et al. 2011; Senju et al. 2009) and others reporting 
adults with ASD (Kana et al. 2009; Kirkovski et al. 2015; 
Ponnet et al. 2004; Roeyers et al. 2001; Spek et al. 2010) and 
high levels of autistic traits (Nijhof et al. 2016) show typical 
performances on mentalizing tasks. A number of factors may 
have contributed to these inconsistent indings, including 
whether task instructions explicitly stated that participants 
should mentalize, the stimuli used, the type of mentaliz-
ing assessed and the method used to measure mentalizing 
abilities.
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The majority of previous studies have explicitly asked 
participants to make inferences about the internal states of 
others (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al. 2001; Gallagher et al. 2000; 
Happé 1994; Holt et al. 2014a, b; Jollife and Baron-Cohen 
1999a, b; Kana et al. 2009, 2014; McAleer et al. 2011; Roey-
ers et al. 2001). Only a small number of studies have exam-
ined the capabilities of adults with ASD to infer the internal 
states of others when not speciically told to do so; this is 
known as ‘implicit mentalizing’. The existing adult litera-
ture shows consistent implicit mentalizing deicits associated 
with ASD (Castelli et al. 2002; Rosenblau et al. 2015; Schu-
werk et al. 2014; Senju et al. 2009) but the explicit mental-
izing data are inconsistent (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Castelli 
et al. 2002; Kana et al. 2009; Kirkovski et al. 2015; Ponnet 
et al. 2004). It may be that the instructions given concerning 
which elements should be attended to during explicit tasks, 
allow some high functioning adults with ASD to perform at 
a typical level, which they would be unable to do without 
the explicit instructions.
The apparent existence of a consistent implicit mentaliz-
ing deicit but lack of a consistent explicit mentalizing dei-
cit in adults with ASD in the existing literature may, how-
ever, be attributable to other confounding factors, including 
stimuli diferences. Most studies that have reported implicit 
mentalizing deicits in adults with ASD have used movie 
stimuli (e.g. Rosenblau et al. 2015; Schuwerk et al. 2014; 
Senju et al. 2009), which were more complex and natural-
istic than stimuli used in the majority of explicit tasks. The 
stimuli used in the majority of explicit mentalizing tasks 
were passages of text, still images or cartoon strips which 
provide very simplistic representations of social interactions 
and a number of these studies found no mentalizing deicits 
in adults with ASD (e.g. Kana et al. 2009; Kirkovski et al. 
2015; Ponnet et al. 2004; Roeyers et al. 2001; Spek et al. 
2010). In support of this argument, two previous studies 
(Ponnet et al. 2004; Roeyers et al. 2001) investigated the 
abilities of adults with Pervasive Development Disorders 
(PDD; including ASD) to explicitly infer the mental states 
of others using both simple stimuli (images of people’s eyes 
and short passages of text) and naturalistic videos of social 
interactions. The adults with PDD were not impaired on the 
explicit mentalizing tasks that used the simple stimuli but 
did show impairments with the more complex naturalistic 
stimuli (Ponnet et al. 2004; Roeyers et al. 2001). Addi-
tionally, the only previous study that has investigated both 
implicit and explicit mentalizing abilities using complex, 
naturalistic stimuli found that adults with ASD displayed 
equivalent impairments on both implicit and explicit tasks 
(Rosenblau et al. 2015).
Diferences in the way mentalizing performances have 
been measured may have also contributed to existence of 
consistent implicit mentalizing deicits but inconsistent 
data regarding explicit mentalizing abilities in the previous 
adult literature. Some studies have measured implicit men-
talizing abilities using eye-tracking data alone (Schuwerk 
et al. 2014; Senju et al. 2009). In these studies, participants 
watched animations in which a character wrongly believed 
an object was in a certain location. Adults with ASD spent 
shorter periods ixating on the place in which the character 
wrongly believed the object was located. This was inter-
preted as impaired implicit mentalizing. However, a number 
of studies have reported that adults with ASD have unusual 
patterns of eye gaze when processing social stimuli (Klie-
mann et al. 2010; Pelphrey et al. 2002) and unusual ixation 
patterns have been found during face processing tasks in the 
absence of behavioural diferences (Rutherford and Towns 
2008; Spezio et al. 2007). Therefore, adults with ASD may 
be able to deduce the internal states of others despite atypi-
cal eye movements. In contrast, explicit mentalizing studies 
have always used measurable behavioural outcomes to assess 
mentalizing abilities.
The term ‘mentalizing’ covers a variety of internal state 
inferences which may involve diferent processes (Call and 
Tomasello 2008; Pineda and Hecht 2009); it is possible that 
the diferent internal state inferences required across studies 
may have also contributed to the heterogeneity in the litera-
ture. Previous studies have reliably found that adults with 
ASD are impaired at inferring others’ intentions (Kana et al. 
2014; Murdaugh et al. 2014; Ponnet et al. 2004; Roeyers 
et al. 2001) and others’ emotions (Atkinson 2009; Cassidy 
et al. 2013; Enticott et al. 2013; Hubert et al. 2007; Nack-
aerts et al. 2012). However, the existing literature is more 
inconsistent regarding abilities to infer others’ mental states 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Kana et al. 2009; Kirkovski et al. 
2015; Kleinman et al. 2001; Roeyers et al. 2001; Spek et al. 
2010) or false beliefs (Frith and Happé 1994; Schuwerk et al. 
2014; Senju et al. 2009). The neuroimaging and develop-
mental literature also support the argument that the diferent 
subcomponents of mentalizing relect diferent processes; 
the results of a meta-analysis suggest that children develop 
the ability to infer others’ desires before they are able to infer 
others’ beliefs and can detect others’ emotions before they 
can deduce false beliefs (Wellman and Liu 2004). Addition-
ally, neuroimaging studies have shown that diferent brain 
areas are active during mentalizing tasks depending on the 
inferences being made (Pineda and Hecht 2009; Schurz et al. 
2014). Collectively, these data suggest that the subcompo-
nents of mentalizing are distinct processes associated with 
diferent brain areas and developmental trajectories.
In summary, although ASD is associated with mental-
izing deicits, the nature of these deicits is unclear. The 
existing literature suggests that adults with ASD are more 
likely to show impaired performances on implicit mental-
izing tasks using complex naturalistic stimuli that probe 
understanding of intentions or emotions. To our knowl-
edge, only one study to date has assessed both implicit 
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and explicit mentalizing abilities in adults with ASD using 
measurable behavioural outcomes (Rosenblau et al. 2015). 
In this study, a comparison between adults with and with-
out ASD found that participants with ASD showed reduced 
abilities to both implicitly and explicitly infer the mental 
states of actors from short movies but there was no difer-
ence in the degree of impairment between tasks. However, 
this study did not use a non-mentalizing control task so 
it is unclear whether the poorer performances observed 
in adults with ASD were speciically due to mentalizing 
deicits or whether poorer performances relect reduced 
abilities to perform the experimental tasks in general. Thus 
the current study aimed to test the abilities of adults with 
ASD to both implicitly and explicitly mentalize, using 
complex stimuli, measurable behavioural outcomes and a 
non-mentalizing control task.
This study speciically investigated the abilities of adults 
with ASD to both implicitly and explicitly infer the inten-
tions of others from the kinematics of their hand actions 
using the same naturalistic stimuli. Previous studies have 
shown that hand actions with diferent intentions display 
subtle diferences in action kinematics and adults without 
ASD are able to infer others’ intentions from these difer-
ences in action kinematics (Ansuini et al. 2015; Sartori et al. 
2009). In the irst experiment, participants watched videos 
of actors playing a poker chip game and had to decide which 
actor, from a choice of two, they would prefer to play the 
poker chip game with. Participants were shown one video 
depicting an actor deliberately not passing a poker chip to 
another player (‘spiteful’ action) and a video of another 
actor accidentally not passing a poker chip to another player 
(‘clumsy’ action). In this task, participants were not explic-
itly asked to infer actors’ intentions; rather participants’ 
choice of actor was dependent upon ‘covert’ mentalizing 
(implicit mentalizing task). In contrast, during the second 
experiment, participants watched the same movies and 
were explicitly asked to infer the intentions of the actors. 
In addition to contrasting the performance of the ASD and 
typically developing groups, due to the spectral nature of 
ASD, we then examined the relationship between the level 
of autistic traits displayed and abilities to infer others’ inten-
tions across all participants. We also tracked participants’ 
eye movements during both experiments in order to test 
whether any potential behavioural diferences associated 
with autistic traits could be explained by atypical ixation 
patterns (cf. Schuwerk et al. 2014; Senju et al. 2009). It was 
predicted that adults with ASD would display reduced abili-
ties to infer the intentions of others compared to matched 
control participants and across all participants higher levels 
of autistic traits would predict poorer performances. We also 
hypothesised that mentalizing deicits associated with ASD 
would be more evident in the implicit task compared to the 
explicit task.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-one adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; 
14 male) were recruited for this study. The majority of the 
ASD sample were students from the University of York 
(n = 13) and the remaining ASD participants were recruited 
from a local support group. Four participants were excluded 
for having scores that were not signiicantly higher than 
chance on the control task (see below). This resulted in a 
inal participant sample of 17 adults with ASD (10 male ages 
18–56, mean age = 23.71, SD = 9.24) and 17 individually 
age, sex and IQ matched control participants (TD—Typi-
cally Developing; ages 18–55, mean age = 23.71, SD = 9.07). 
See Table 1 for participant demographics.
All participants in the ASD group had a clinical diagnosis 
of Asperger’s (n = 14) or Autism Spectrum Disorder. All 
diagnoses were issued by qualiied clinicians external to this 
study. None of the ASD participants had a history of delayed 
language development or existing learning diiculties. All 
participants had IQ scores above 100. All neurotypical par-
ticipants reported that they had no neurological disorders 
and adults diagnosed with ASD reported no other neurologi-
cal conditions.
Experiments were approved by the ethics committee of 
the Department of Psychology, University of York, and were 
performed in accordance with the ethical standards outlined 
in the 1990 Declaration of Helsinki.
Psychological Tests
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-2; 
Lord et al. 2000), Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Con-
stantino et al. 2003), The Awareness of Social Inference 
Test (TASIT; McDonald et al. 2006), Autism Quotient (AQ; 
Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) and Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler 1999) were administered 
Table 1  Participant demographic information; group mean (SD) val-
ues
p values were derived from a one-way MANOVA unless otherwise 
stated
a The IQ scores were obtained using the two-subtest version of 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI)
b The verbal WASI scores given are standardised scores (T-scores)
ASD TD p
Age 23.71 (9.24) 23.71 (9.07) 0.97
Gender (male:female) 10:7 10:7 1.00  (X2)
IQ (WASI)a 120.12 (9.32) 120.00 (10.09) 0.93
WASI verbal  scoreb 62.88 (6.66) 61.61 (7.52) 0.86
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to all participants. The ADOS-2 assessments were ilmed 
and then scored by both the experimenter and an independ-
ent rater who was blind as to whether participants had a 
diagnosis or not. Both the experimenter and independent 
rater were trained to the level of research reliability on the 
ADOS-2 assessment. If the ADOS-2 scores difered between 
the experimenter and independent rater, the assessment mov-
ies were re-watched and a inal score was agreed on. The 
independent ADOS-2 scores never difered by more than 2 
points between the raters. The SRS and TASIT are designed 
to detect social impairment. The SRS is a self-report meas-
ure and TASIT measures abilities to detect sarcasm and lies 
from movies showing social interactions. The AQ is a self-
report measure of autistic traits. The two subtest version of 
the WASI was used to measure the IQ of participants. All 
these psychological tests have been shown to have good psy-
chometric properties (Allison et al. 2011; Constantino et al. 
2003; Hurst et al. 2007; McDonald et al. 2006; Oosterling 
et al. 2010).
Stimuli
The movie stimuli were designed to show diferent actors 
playing a poker chip exchange game. The poker chip game 
involved passing poker chips to another player through slots 
in a white wooden board (see Fig. 1). Ten diferent types of 
hand actions were ilmed (Panasonic TM900 HD-DV cam-
era; 1920 × 1080 pixels at 50 Hz progressive scan). Five of 
the hand actions involved pushing poker chips with the index 
inger of the right hand through a slot in the board which 
was level with the surface of the table. The other ive hand 
actions involved grasping poker chips with the index inger 
and thumb of the right hand and passing them through a slot 
in the board at head height. Two diferent types of actions 
were used to generalise results across diferent action types. 
Both pushing and grasping actions were executed by the 
actor in ive diferent ways: (1) clumsily failing to pass one 
poker chip—here the actor had a positive intention to pass 
the chip to the other player, but the outcome of the action 
was unsuccessful (clumsy 1); (2) Clumsily failing to pass 
ive pokers chips; positive intention to pass the chips, but 
the outcome of the action was unsuccessful (clumsy 5); (3) 
Spitefully (deliberately) failing to pass one poker chip; no 
intention to pass the chip to the other player and the outcome 
of the action was unsuccessful (spiteful 1); (4) Successfully 
passing one poker chip; the actor intended to pass the poker 
chip and the action was successful (successful 1); (5) Suc-
cessfully passing ive poker chips; the actor intended to pass 
the poker chips and the action was successful (successful 5).
Twenty-eight diferent actors (14 female) were ilmed 
performing all ten actions, from a three-quarters view from 
behind at an angle that allowed their right hand to be seen 
in front of them for the entire duration of the hand action 
but only showed a limited side proile of their face. This 
prevented participants from using facial information to infer 
the intentions of actors and required intentions to be inferred 
from the action kinematics alone (cf. Sartori et al. 2009; 
Ansuini et al. 2015). This was done in order to investigate 
whether adults with ASD are impaired at inferring others’ 
intentions irrespective of reduced ixation on the eyes, which 
has been well reported (Bird et al. 2011; Kliemann et al. 
2010; Papagiannopoulou et al. 2014; Tottenham et al. 2014).
The actors sat in front of a white wooden board meas-
uring 84 × 61 cm with two slots (4 × 17 cm) cut out of it 
(see Fig. 1). Actions started with the actor’s right hand rest-
ing on a small marker for 3 s. In order to ensure all hand 
actions lasted approximately 2 s, a buzzer indicated to the 
actors when to move their hand towards the poker chips and 
Fig. 1  Example screenshots 
from the hand action movies 
depicting positive and negative 
intentions. a The actor pushes 
ive poker chips with a positive 
intention (clumsy 5 pushing 
action). b The actor deliberately 
pushes a poker chip away from 
the slot (spiteful 1 pushing 
action). c The actor accidentally 
drops a poker chip (clumsy 1 
grasping action). d The actor 
deliberately drops the poker 
chip (spiteful 1 grasping action). 
The squares overlaid onto 
action a illustrate the regions 
of interest (ROIs) used for the 
eye-tracking analyses
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signalled again to indicate when the actors should let go 
of the poker chips. Actors performed each of the 10 difer-
ent actions at least 3 times; for each actor the action with 
the best timing and that best depicted the particular inten-
tion was selected for the inal movie. Movies were edited 
(Sony Vegas Pro 10) to inish 0.4 s after the poker chips 
left the actors’ hands; for grasping actions, this was always 
before the poker chips hit the table. In addition, the starts of 
all movies were trimmed such that they lasted exactly 4 s. 
Editing the movies in this way meant that movement onset 
occurred at slightly diferent times in each movie (frames 
32–146).
The chosen movies were rated by 30 independent observ-
ers who were students at the University of York. Observ-
ers classiied each action as either ‘clumsy’, ‘spiteful’ or 
‘neither’ by pressing one of three keys on the computer 
keyboard. Clumsy responses were coded as − 1, spiteful 
responses were coded as 1 and neither responses were coded 
as 0. For each action, scores were averaged across partici-
pants to generate an index of the degree of ‘spitefulness’ 
conveyed by each movie where − 1 indicates a strong evalua-
tion of the action as clumsy, + 1 indicates a strong evaluation 
of the action as spiteful, and 0 indicates an evaluation of the 
action as neither clumsy or spiteful. Spiteful videos were 
required to have spitefulness indexes higher than 0.4 and 
clumsy videos were required to have indexes below − 0.4 
to be included in the stimuli set. Three clumsy movies had 
spitefulness indexes that were higher than − 0.4 and there-
fore were deemed to not clearly portray the desired intention 
(0.16, 0.03 and − 0.03 spitefulness indexes). These movies 
were replaced with new stimuli which were rated by another 
30 independent observers and these stimuli all obtained rat-
ings lower than − 0.4. The inal stimuli used fell into three 
signiicantly (F(2,165) = 1644.94, p < .001, ηp
2 = .95) distinct 
groups; clumsy (M = − .68, SD = 0.15), spiteful (M = 0.80, 
SD = 0.13) and successful (M = 0.01, SD = 0.03) actions.
Experiment 1 (Implicit mentalizing): Design 
and Procedure
Experiment 1 tested the participants’ abilities to implicitly 
infer the intentions of others from their hand actions. The 
task was adapted from one previously used with children 
(Behne and Carpenter 2005) and chimpanzees (Call et al. 
2004). In these studies, experimenters either deliberately 
or ‘accidentally’ did not give the chimpanzees or children 
rewards (in the form of food or a toy respectively). Both 
the chimpanzees and the children attempted to interact with 
the experimenters for longer when experimenters acciden-
tally dropped the reward rather than when they deliberately 
did not give the reward. This implied the experimenters’ 
intentions had been implicitly inferred and consequently the 
appropriate social decisions were made.
In our experiment, each participant took part in a poker 
chip exchange game with the experimenter prior to the main 
experiment in order to familiarise them with the actions 
shown during the experiment, and to demonstrate the value 
of receiving poker chips from a partner. Participants were 
told that the experimenter would start with 8 poker chips 
that were each worth one pound. However, in order for the 
experimenter to receive money for their poker chips at the 
end of the game, they had to give at least one poker chip to 
the participant. If the experimenter had all the poker chips 
on their side of the board at the end of the game, neither the 
experimenter nor the participant would receive any money. 
The experimenter then had three chances to make a deal with 
the participant; they would pass some poker chips through 
the slots in the wooden board to the participant on the other 
side. The participant had to accept or reject the number of 
poker chips that were ofered each turn. If the participant 
accepted then they would receive a pound coin for every 
chip on their side, if they rejected the number of poker chips 
ofered, then the experimenter would have to ofer a diferent 
number of chips. If no agreement was reached after three 
rounds then neither the participant nor the experimenter 
received any money. The aim of the game for the participant 
was to end up with as many chips as possible on their side 
of the board. Every participant played the poker chip game 
four times to gain a good understanding of the purpose of 
passing the chips and the value of the chips (three times as 
the participant and once in the experimenter role). Over the 
three games in the participant role, each participant expe-
rienced (i) a round in which the experimenter acted spite-
fully (experimenter ofered no chips to the participant and 
explained they were doing so in order to reduce the number 
of chances to make a deal and increase the chances of the 
participant accepting a lower ofer); and (ii) a round in which 
the experimenter acted clumsily (experimenter accidentally 
dropped the poker chips and thus failed to make an ofer) so 
that all participants had practical experience of both clumsy 
and spiteful actions. Participants also played one game in 
which they switched roles with the experimenter to ensure 
they understood the game fully.
A PC running MATLAB R2015a controlled the experi-
ment and recorded participant responses. Participants sat 
approximately 60 cm from an Acer GD245HQ 24Ǝ HD 
monitor on which all stimuli were presented. Participants’ 
eye movements were recorded during the experiment using 
an EyeTribe eye tracker (The EyeTribe Abs, Copenhagen). 
Participants rested their heads in a chin rest and ixation 
data from both eyes was recorded at 30 Hz. A 9-point cali-
bration procedure was carried out before conducting each 
experiment. Participants for which the eye-tracker could not 
reach a satisfactory level of accuracy on the calibration (3/5 
star rating; indicating < 1° accuracy) were excluded from 
subsequent eye-tracking analysis. Eye tracker data recording 
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was controlled using the EyeTribe MATLAB toolbox (Dal-
maijer; available on GitHub: https://github.com/esdalmaijer/
EyeTribe-Toolbox-for-Matlab).
Participants were told that they would watch movies of 
individuals playing the poker chip game they had just played 
themselves. Each movie would show a player’s irst attempt 
to ofer poker chips to someone on the other side of the 
board. The participants watched pairs of movies and had 
to decide subsequently whether they would rather continue 
playing the poker chip game with the actor in the irst or 
the second movie. Each trial consisted of two actions of the 
same type (either both grasping or both pushing) presented 
sequentially with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 ms, 
during which the screen was black except for a white ixa-
tion cross. Following the second movie a response screen 
was displayed and participants had to indicate whether they 
would rather interact with the actor in the irst or second 
movie by pressing either 1 or 2 on the keyboard (see Fig. 2).
Diferent forms of decision making were required to 
make a choice between the irst and second actors in three 
diferent conditions; we refer to them as ‘Mentalizing’, 
‘Action’ or ‘Either’ conditions. (1) Mentalizing condi-
tion: correct decisions could be based upon inferences of 
intention only and consisted of movies of an action with a 
positive intention (clumsy 1) and an action with a negative 
intention (spiteful 1). Here, in order to decide between 
the actors, participants needed to infer the intentions of 
the actors from the kinematics of their actions. The out-
comes of the actions were the same (both actors failed 
to pass a poker chip to another player) but the intentions 
of the actors were diferent. (2) Action condition: correct 
decisions could be based upon action recognition only, 
consisted of movies of actors successfully passing poker 
chips (successful 1 and successful 5). Here, in order to 
decide between the actors, participants needed to recog-
nise whether the actor was passing 1 or 5 poker chips, and 
did not require participants to mentalize in order to com-
plete the task. (3) Either condition: decisions were based 
upon recognition of the action, or possibly inferences of 
intention, and consisted of movies of actors attempting to 
pass poke chips (clumsy 1 and clumsy 5). Here, in order 
to decide between the actors, participants were expected to 
focus on the number of chips being ofered and choose the 
actor trying to pass the higher number of poker chips, but 
participants may have automatically processed the actors’ 
intentions and recognized that both actors have the same 
positive intention. This condition was included in order to 
test for the diferences in success of the actions between 
the Mentalizing and Action conditions, given that Men-
talizing trials always showed unsuccessful actions and 
Fig. 2  Sequence of stages dur-
ing a Mentalizing trial in the 
implicit task. Action 1 shows a 
female actor deliberately drop-
ping a poker chip (spiteful 1) 
and action 2 shows a male actor 
accidentally dropping a poker 
chip (clumsy 1). In order to 
decide whether to interact with 
actor 1 or actor 2 the participant 
must infer the intentions of 
the actors from the kinemat-
ics of their actions because the 
outcomes of the two actions are 
identical
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Action trials always showed successful actions; Either tri-
als always showed unsuccessful actions but did not require 
mentalizing.
At the start of testing, participants completed six practice 
trials (two of each condition) in order to familiarise them 
with the experimental procedure. The stimuli used in the 
practice trials were not included in the main experiments 
and the actors compared against each other in the implicit 
practice trials were not compared against each other in the 
main implicit experiment.
Participants completed 72 trials in total, viewing 144 
actions (12 repeats of each action except clumsy 1 which was 
shown 24 times); trials lasted approximately 12 s depending 
on response times, and testing took approximately 15 min. 
The same actor never performed the same action (e.g. spite-
ful1 pushing action) twice, such that participants did not 
learn to associate certain behaviours with speciic individu-
als. Every actor was seen the same number of times and 
each actor performed a preferable action 50% of the time; 
actor gender was also counterbalanced. Condition order was 
randomised and action order was counterbalanced so that the 
preferred action would occur irst in 50% of the trials, e.g. on 
50% of the Mentalizing trials the clumsy movies were shown 
before spiteful movies.
Experiment 2 (Explicit mentalizing): Design 
and Procedure
In the second experiment, participants were asked explicitly 
to report the intentions of actors presented in movies. Partic-
ipants returned approximately 3 months (average 112 days) 
after they completed Experiment 1 to complete Experiment 
2. This helped minimalize the possibility of participants’ 
previous implicit judgements influencing their explicit 
judgements of the actions. Two of the ASD participants 
were unable to return to complete the explicit experiment, 
leaving a sample of thirty participants (15 matched pairs) in 
the explicit experiment.
As with experiment 1, participants irst completed six 
practice trials (two of each stimulus type), in order to famil-
iarise them with the experimental procedure. Participants 
then viewed all 144 of the movies seen in the Experiment 1. 
After each movie, participants had to indicate whether they 
thought the movie showed a ‘spiteful’ (deliberate), clumsy 
(accidental) or successful action by pressing 1, 2 or 3 respec-
tively on the computer keyboard. The experiment consisted 
of two blocks of 10 min (72 movies shown in each). Each 
block contained 36 clumsy actions, 12 spiteful actions and 
24 successful actions, the order of movies was randomised 
within each block and no movies were repeated. A response 
screen was shown after each movie until the participant 
responded. The PC, display and eye-tracker were all identi-
cal to Experiment 1.
Behavioural Performance Analysis
For Experiment 1, the numbers of correct responses each 
participant gave in each condition (Mentalizing, Either, 
Action) were calculated. All 34 participants included in 
the analyses had scores signiicantly higher than chance 
in the Action condition (Binomial test (0.5), p < .05, 
scores > 17/24), indicating that all individuals under-
stood the task. We then subtracted the number of correct 
responses on the Action condition from the number of cor-
rect responses on both the Mentalizing and Either condition 
for each participant. This allowed us to identify any task 
speciic deicits rather than generalised poorer performances 
on experimental tasks.
For Experiment 2, we calculated the proportion of cor-
rect responses for the mentalizing conditions (clumsy and 
spiteful actions) and non-mentalizing condition (successful 
actions) for each participant. Similar to Experiment 1, dif-
ferences between mentalizing and non-mentalizing condi-
tions were calculated to provide a speciic measure of the 
ability of participants to explicitly infer the intentions of 
others, whilst controlling for ability to do a simple action 
discrimination task.
Task-speciic scores were not normally distributed even 
after log transformations had been applied. Therefore, non-
parametric analyses (Mann–Whitney U tests) were used to 
investigate group diferences in mentalizing abilities. Fur-
ther, due to the spectral nature of ASD, linear regressions 
were used to examine the inluence of autistic traits (con-
tinuous independent variable) on task-speciic performances 
(continuous dependent variables). These linear regressions 
were conducted in order to identify whether any signiicant 
group diferences that were found also showed a signiicant 
relationship with the continuum of autistic traits across all 
participants. In order to obtain a single score for each par-
ticipant that relected the level of autistic traits that they 
displayed, we performed a principal components analysis 
(PCA) on all the psychological test scores (ADOS-2, AQ, 
SRS and TASIT). The only factor with an eigenvalue higher 
than Kaiser’s criteria of 1 was extracted and used as a meas-
ure of autistic traits. Data analysis was carried out using 
R i386 3.2.3 (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 
Vienna, Austria, http://www.r-project.org).
Eye‑Tracking Analysis
Eye tracking data was analysed using the EyeMMV MAT-
LAB toolbox (Krassanakis et  al. 2014). Data from the 
implicit and explicit experiments were analysed in the same 
way. First, heatmaps were created using the data from all 
participants in order to identify regions of interest (ROIs); 
these were: the head of the actor, the initial start position of 
the hand with the poker chips, and the grasp release point. 
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Three rectangular ROIs were drawn for each movie outlining 
these areas of interest. Due to the similarity in the spatial 
extent of the actions on the screen it was then possible to 
combine the co-ordinates of the ROIs from all 144 movies to 
make a single set of ROIs that encompassed the ROIs from 
all movies (see Fig. 1a). We then calculated the number and 
duration of ixations within each ROI during each condition 
for each participant. We deined the minimum duration for 
ixation detection as 150 ms.
The duration of ixations in each ROI as a percentage 
of the total number of ixations were calculated for each 
participant in each condition. As for the behavioural data, 
for Experiment 1 the duration each participant ixated in 
each ROI during the Action condition was subtracted from 
the time spent ixating in each ROI during the Mentalizing 
and Either conditions. For Experiment 2, the durations of 
ixation in each ROI during the non-mentalizing condition 
were subtracted from the durations of the ixation in each 
ROI during the Mentalizing condition. For Experiment 1, 
group diferences in ixation patterns were tested using sepa-
rate mixed-model ANOVAs for each ROI (with condition 
[Mentalizing-Action, Either-Action] as the within subjects 
variable and diagnosis as the between subjects variable). For 
Experiment 2, the eye-tracking data were found to violate 
the assumption of normality even after a log transformation 
had been applied so non-parametric Mann–Whitney U tests 
were conducted to examine potential group diferences in 
mentalizing-speciic ixation patterns. For both experiments, 
linear regressions were used to examine the inluence of 
autistic traits on changes in the duration of ixations in each 
ROI across conditions. The data from diferent ROIs were 
treated separately because the data were not independent 
(participants could only ixate in one ROI at a time).
Results
Psychological Tests
All psychological assessment scores were highly corre-
lated with each other except for IQ which did not correlate 
with the scores on any other psychological tests (Bivariate 
Pearson correlations; see Table 2). Three female partici-
pants with an ASD diagnosis obtained ADOS scores below 
the clinical cut-of. However, all of these participants had 
AQ scores above the clinical cut-of as well as SRS scores 
that indicated either moderate or severe social impairments 
(see Table 3 for group means scores on all psychological 
assessments).
Given that the psychological test scores assessing autistic 
traits were highly correlated with each other (all rs > 0.54) 
they were suitable for principal component analysis, the 
Kasier-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling accuracy was 0.81 
(above 0.6) and Barlett’s test of sphericity was signiicant 
χ2(6) = 108.82 p < .001. Additionally, the communalities 
were all above 0.7 supporting the inclusion of all the psy-
chological tests in the principle components analysis (PCA). 
PCA with varimax rotation was used. The initial eigenval-
ues from the PCA analysis showed that one factor (with an 
eigenvalue of 3.23) explained 80.81% of the variance in 
psychological test scores. No other factors had eigenvalues 
higher than Kaiser’s criteria of 1 and therefore only one fac-
tor was extracted. This factor was labelled ‘autistic traits’ 
(see Table 3 for group mean values).
Experiment 1
ASD participants displayed poorer performances on 
the implicit task than matched controls (see Table 4) but 
group diferences were not signiicant (Mentalizing-Action 
scores: U = 112.50, p = .27, r = .19; Either-Action scores: 
U = 90.00, p = .06, r = .33). Linear regression analyses also 
showed that higher levels of autistic traits were associated 
with poorer performances on the implicit task but this trend 
was not signiicant (see Fig. 3; Mentalizing-Action scores: 
Table 2  Correlations between psychological test scores
***p < .001
1 2 3 4
1. ADOS
2. AQ .74***
3. SRS .77*** .90***
4. TASIT .54*** .73*** .76***
5. IQ .04 .17 .09 .10
Table 3  Participants’ psychological test scores; group mean (SD) val-
ues
p values were obtained from one-way MANOVA
ASD TD p ηp
2
ADOS 8.47 (2.58) 2.76 (1.86) < .001 .63
AQ 35.71 (6.47) 16.47 (6.57) < .001 .70
TASIT 49.24 (8.61) 57.76 (3.72) .001 .31
SRS 114.12 (24.26) 42.76 (18.87) < .001 .74
Autistic traits .84 (.63) − .84 (.42) < .001 .73
Table 4  Group behavioural performances; median (IQR) values
ASD TD
Implicit mentalizing-action − 3.00 (6.50) − 2.00 (6.50)
Implicit either-action − 4.00 (10.00) − 2.00 (1.50)
Explicit mentalizing-non-mentalizing − 1.88 (3.50) − 0.74 (1.13)
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F(1,32) = 3.11, p = .09,  R2 = 0.09, 95% CI [− 5.91, − 2.33]; 
Either-Action scores: F(1,32) = 3.54, p = .07,  R2 = 0.10, 95% 
CI [− 3.14, 0.124]).
In addition, adults with ASD did not show atypical 
changes in fixation patterns between conditions in the 
implicit experiment and changes in ixation patterns were 
not signiicantly diferent across Mentalizing and Either con-
ditions for any of the ROIs [head ROI: task [F(1,26) = 0.45, 
p = .51, ηp
2 = .02], diagnosis [F(1,26) = 0.77, p = .39, 
ηp
2 = .03], task*diagnosis interaction [F(1,26) = 0.23, 
p = .63, ηp
2 = .01; Poker chip ROI: task [F(1,26) = 2.41, 
p = .13, ηp
2 = .09], diagnosis [F(1,26) = .32, p = .57, 
ηp
2 = .01], task*diagnosis interaction [F(1,26) = 0.70, p = .41, 
ηp
2 = 0.03]; Release point ROI: task [F(1,26) = 3.27, p = .08, 
ηp
2 = .11], diagnosis [F(1,26) = 2.99, p = .10, ηp
2 = .10], 
task*diagnosis interaction [F(1,26) = 0.55, p = .47, ηp
2 = .02]. 
Group average values for the percentage of time spent ixat-
ing in each ROI can be seen in Table 5. The level of autistic 
traits that participants displayed also did not signiicantly 
predict changes in the duration of ixation within any ROI 
between conditions (see Table 6).
Experiment 2
Participants in the ASD group displayed signiicant explicit 
mentalizing deicits (Median = − 1.88; IQR = 3.50) com-
pared to matched controls (Median = − .74; IQR = 1.13; 
U = 61.50, p = .03, r = .39). The participant in the ASD group 
with the highest level of autistic traits was identiied as an 
outlier in the linear regression analysis for the explicit task 
(Cook’s distance > 1 and leverage value > n/4), therefore this 
participant was removed from the linear regression analysis.
Participants with higher levels of autistic traits displayed 
poorer performances on the explicit mentalizing condition 
but this was a non-signiicant trend (mentalizing-non-men-
talizing scores; F(1,27) = 3.42, p = .08,  R2 = 0.11, 95% CI 
[− 1.15, 0.06] see Fig. 4).
Participants with ASD displayed typical changes in the 
duration of ixation between mentalizing and non-mentaliz-
ing conditions for all ROIs (Head ROI: U = 75.00, p = .32, 
r = .19: Poker chip ROI: U = 77.00, p = .36, r = .17: Release 
point ROI: U = 74.00, p = .29, r = .20). The level of autistic 
traits that participants displayed did not signiicantly predict 
changes in the duration of ixation between mentalizing and 
Fig. 3  The relationship between the levels of autistic traits displayed 
and performances on the implicit task in the Mentalizing condition 
(a) and Either condition (b). Although there was a trend of poorer 
performances with high levels of autistic traits, linear regression 
analysis found that the level of autistic traits displayed was not a sig-
niicant predictor of performance in the Mentalizing (F(1,32) = 3.11, 
p = .09,  R2 = 0.09) or the Either condition (F(1,32) = 3.54, p = .07, 
 R2 = 0.10). The curved lines represent 95% conidence intervals
Table 5  Percentage duration of ixation in each ROI; Mean (SD) val-
ues
a Median (IQR) values presented as non-parametric tests were used
ASD TD
Head ROI
 Implicit mentalizing-action 4.64 (9.68) 2.32 (12.01)
 Implicit either-action 4.32 (8.00) 0.37 (11.08)
 Explicit mentalizing-non-mentaliz-
inga
0.06 (18.05) 1.91 (13.13)
Poker chip ROI
 Implicit mentalizing-action 1.16 (6.15) − 1.83 (8.76)
 Implicit either-action 2.36 (5.58) 2.12 (11.96)
 Explicit mentalizing-non-mentaliz-
inga
4.12 (15.89) 0.75 (6.21)
Release point ROI
 Implicit mentalizing-action − 5.34 (3.98) − 1.99 (5.52)
 Implicit either-action − 6.04 (4.24) − 3.67 (4.76)
 Explicit mentalizing-non-mentaliz-
inga
− 3.53 (6.81) − 3.82 (2.70)
 Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
1 3
and non-mentalizing conditions within any ROI (Head ROI: 
F(1,26) = 2.23, p = .15,  R2 = 0.08, 95% CI [− 10.77, 1.71]; 
poker chips ROI: F(1,26) = 1.63, p = .21,  R2 = 0.06, 95% CI 
[− 2.04, 8.76]; release point ROI: F(1,26) = 1.63, p = .90, 
 R2 < 0.001, 95% CI [− 1.65, 1.47]).
Discussion
This study aimed to investigate the abilities of adults with 
ASD to both implicitly and explicitly infer the intentions 
of others. In the irst experiment, participants completed a 
task where mentalizing was implicit. Here participants were 
asked to make decisions about who they wanted to interact 
with between pairs of actors and in some cases these social 
decisions required the intentions of the actors to be inferred 
in order to make the appropriate choice. In contrast, during 
the second experiment, participants were explicitly asked to 
report the intentions of actors. Our results showed that adults 
with ASD displayed explicit mentalizing deicits compared 
to matched controls. Adults with ASD did not display sig-
niicant implicit mentalizing abilities. Furthermore, ASD 
participants did not display atypical ixation patterns dur-
ing both the explicit and implicit experiments. Therefore, the 
explicit mentalizing deicits exhibited by adults with ASD 
cannot be explained by diferences in ixation.
The explicit mentalizing deicit found with adults with 
ASD in this study supports a number of previous studies 
which found adults with ASD were impaired at explic-
itly inferring others’ intentions (Happé 1994; Kana et al. 
2014; Moran et al. 2011). Our data are also consistent with 
reported diiculties for adults with ASD in everyday life 
(O’Neal 2013; The National Autistic Society 2014). How-
ever, some previous studies have not found a connection 
between ASD and impairments in explicitly inferring the 
intentions of others (McAleer et al. 2011; Ponnet et al. 2004; 
Roeyers et al. 2001; Schuwerk et al. 2014). This may be 
due to the simplicity of the stimuli used in these studies, 
e.g. passages of text and still images (Ponnet et al. 2004; 
Roeyers et al. 2001; Schuwerk et al. 2014). In contrast, our 
study used a task with complex, naturalistic stimuli more 
akin to social environments in which individuals are required 
to make judgements. The use of more simplistic stimuli in 
previous studies may have allowed some adults with ASD 
to explicitly infer the intentions of others, perhaps with the 
help of learned strategies, which are of less help in more 
complex and natural settings. In support of this argument, 
two previous studies have investigated the ability of adults 
with Pervasive Development Disorders (PDDs; including 
ASD) to infer mental states both using simple stimuli and 
complex, naturalistic stimuli (Ponnet et al. 2004; Roeyers 
et al. 2001). Their results showed that adults with PDDs 
were only impaired when complex stimuli were used.
In addition to the group analysis, we also investigated the 
relationship between autistic traits and performance across 
all participants. This additional analysis was conducted as 
ASD is a spectrum disorder rather than a dichotomous clas-
siication and our results clearly show that participants dis-
played a range of autistic traits (see Figs. 3, 4). The linear 
regression analysis showed that across all participants the 
wide range of autistic traits shown was negatively associated 
with performance on both implicit and explicit mentalizing 
tasks, but these remained non-signiicant trends. A previ-
ous study found no relationship between autistic traits and 
both explicit and implicit mentalizing abilities (Nijhof et al. 
Table 6  Results of the 
linear regression analyses 
investigating relationships 
between the eye-tracking data 
and the level of autistic traits 
displayed
Mentalizing-Action Mentalizing-Either
B SE B β t p B SE B β t p
Head ROI − .72 2.05 − .07 − .35 .73 .26 1.86 .03 .14 .89
Poker Chip ROI 2.68 1.36 .36 1.98 .06 1.31 1.76 .14 .74 .46
Release Point ROI − 1.42 .92 − .29 − 1.54 .14 − .99 0.85 − .22 − 1.17 .26
Fig. 4  The relationship between the levels of autistic traits displayed 
and performances on the explicit mentalizing task. Although there 
was a trend of poorer explicit mentalizing performances with high 
levels of autistic traits, linear regression analysis found that the level 
of autistic traits displayed was not a signiicant predictor of perfor-
mance F(1,27) = 3.42, p = .08,  R2 = 0.11. The curved lines represent 
95% conidence intervals
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2016). However, this study did not recruit adults with an 
ASD diagnosis and therefore may have not had the range of 
autistic traits required to ind a relationship between autistic 
traits and mentalizing performance.
Although a trend was found in our study for poorer 
implicit mentalizing abilities associated with higher levels 
of autistic traits, there was not a signiicant group diference 
in performance between those with ASD and their matched 
controls. This lack of clear evidence for a signiicant implicit 
mentalizing deicit in adults with ASD was unexpected. We 
had more participants in this study than in the explicit study, 
which revealed clear signiicant results, so it is unlikely the 
null result is simply due to insuicient statistical power. It 
is possible that if the data had been normally distributed, 
therefore allowing parametric analyses to be carried out, 
the interaction between task and participant group would 
not have been signiicant, relecting comparable deicits 
on both tasks. However, the efect size was much larger for 
the explicit experiment (r = .39) compared to the implicit 
experiment (r = .19), supporting the presence of a signiicant 
explicit deicit but no clear implicit mentalizing deicit in 
these adults with ASD. The existing literature shows consist-
ent implicit mentalizing deicits in adults with ASD (Castelli 
et al. 2002; Rosenblau et al. 2015; Schuwerk et al. 2014; 
Senju et al. 2009). The methods we used to measure men-
talizing abilities may have contributed to the discrepancy 
between our indings and the previous literature. Our study 
measured implicit mentalizing abilities using a measurable 
behavioural outcome and performances were assessed rela-
tive to a control task. Previous implicit mentalizing studies 
in adults with ASD that used complex stimuli have either 
used eye-tracking data alone as a measure of mentalizing 
abilities (Schuwerk et al. 2014; Senju et al. 2009) or not 
included a control task (Rosenblau et al. 2015). Without the 
inclusion of a control task, it cannot be determined whether 
poorer performances linked to ASD are mentalizing-speciic 
or more generalised deicits. Additionally, this study was the 
irst to investigate abilities to implicitly infer intentions in 
adults with ASD; in contrast previous implicit mentalizing 
studies in adults have assessed abilities to infer others’ men-
tal states and false beliefs (Castelli et al. 2002; Rosenblau 
et al. 2015; Schuwerk et al. 2014; Senju et al. 2009). Neu-
roimaging studies have shown that diferent brain areas are 
active during diferent types of mentalizing tasks (Gobbini 
et al. 2007; Pineda and Hecht 2009; Saxe and Powell 2006; 
Schurz et al. 2014), suggesting that the systems used depend 
on the speciic mentalizing task being performed. Therefore, 
it is possible that ASD is related to more pronounced deicits 
on certain subcomponents of mentalizing than others.
The lack of clear evidence for a signiicant implicit men-
talizing deicit in adults with ASD in the current study may 
also be due to the use of action stimuli; implicitly inferring 
others’ intentions from their actions may involve diferent 
processes than implicit mentalizing in the absence of action 
information. Actions with diferent intentions have been 
shown to display diferent kinematic proiles (Manera et al. 
2011; Sartori et al. 2011). The dual-process model sug-
gests that when intentions are inferred from others’ actions, 
these differences in action kinematics allow automatic, 
subconscious processing of intentional information in the 
observer’s own motor system before intentions are actively 
interpreted in a higher-level cortical system (de Lange et al. 
2008; Keysers and Gazzola 2007; Spunt and Lieberman 
2012; Uddin et al. 2007). Neuroimaging data suggest that 
in the absence of action information, others’ intentions aren’t 
subconsciously processed in the motor system (see a review 
and meta-analysis; Gallagher et al. 2000; Schurz et al. 2014). 
Therefore, because intentional information in our study was 
provided by diferences in action kinematics, it is possible 
that subconscious processing of intentional information in 
the motor system allowed adults with ASD to select pref-
erable kinematic proiles (required in our implicit task). 
Whereas, if intentional information was provided by other 
cues, not solely by diferences in action kinematics, then a 
signiicant implicit mentalizing deicit may have been found. 
A larger number of implicit mentalizing studies have been 
carried out in young children than adults and a number of 
studies have shown that children with ASD can implicitly 
infer others’ intentions when intention is portrayed using 
action (Aldridge et al. 2000; Berger and Ingersoll 2014; Car-
penter et al. 2001; Colombi et al. 2009; Liebal et al. 2008; 
Schietecatte et al. 2012) but not when intentions are por-
trayed by social-emotional cues such as eye gaze or facial 
expression (Berger and Ingersoll 2014; Vivanti et al. 2016). 
These data support the theory that inferring intentions from 
action kinematics involves diferent processes than infer-
ring intentions using diferent cues and that implicitly infer-
ring intentions from action kinematics is not signiicantly 
impaired in ASD.
Individuals with ASD and high levels of autistic traits 
also showed relatively poor performance on Either trials. It 
seems likely that mentalizing may have inluenced the social 
judgments participants made during the Either condition 
even though, in principal, mentalizing was not required. The 
Either condition was included in this study in attempt to con-
trol for diferences in the success of actions across mental-
izing and non-mentalizing (Action) conditions. In the Men-
talizing condition, unsuccessful actions were always seen 
and in the Action condition only successful actions were 
seen. The Either condition showed unsuccessful actions but 
did not require mentalizing in order to complete the task, if 
participants made their decisions based purely on the num-
ber of poker chips involved in the hand actions then they 
would make correct choices. However, previous evidence 
suggests that the intentionality of observed hand actions 
is automatically processed (Liepelt et al. 2008), and given 
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participants were blind to the condition, from the partici-
pant’s perspective, the relevant feature of the action (number 
of chips/intention of the actor) only became clear after the 
second movie had been viewed. Thus, it may have been an 
efective strategy to pay attention to the intention of the actor 
in all trials. This may have afected performance in several 
ways. First, participants with higher levels of autistic traits 
may have wrongly attributed negative intent to the preferable 
actions (the actor attempting to pass more poker chips) in 
the Either condition resulting in incorrect choices. Second, 
reading actor intentions may have distracted participants 
from focussing on the number of chips being passed and 
thus the inclusion of both actor intentions and diferential 
number of chips, may have placed a higher cognitive load 
on participants, compared to other conditions and this may 
have contributed to the relatively poor performances in this 
condition.
Despite the poorer explicit mentalizing abilities found in 
adults with ASD compared to matched controls in our study, 
ixation patterns were not diferent in the ASD group. The 
typical ixation patterns exhibited by adults with ASD in 
this study may also be due to the use of action stimuli. The 
majority of the literature reporting atypical ixation patterns 
in adults with ASD have found atypical ixation patterns dur-
ing face processing, in particular, showing reduced ixation 
on the eyes (Dalton et al. 2005; Klin et al. 2002; Pelphrey 
et al. 2002; Sterling et al. 2008). In the current study, the 
actors’ faces were not shown and intentional information 
was portrayed by the kinematics of the actions alone. Adults 
with ASD may alter their eye movements appropriately 
according to diferences in the mentalizing demand of the 
task when intentional information is portrayed by action kin-
ematics but not when internal state inferences require face 
processing. This theory is supported by data from a previous 
study that showed that when adults with ASD naturalisti-
cally viewed videos and pictures of social scenes they dis-
played reduced ixation on people’s faces but showed equiva-
lent ixation on bodies to control participants (Rigby et al. 
2016). The typical eye-tracking data in conjunction with the 
explicit mentalizing deicit in the current study suggest that 
despite receiving the visual cues they needed, adults with 
ASD could not accurately interpret the social cues embed-
ded within the action kinematics in order to explicitly infer 
the actors’ intentions. This dissociation between the behav-
ioural data and the eye-tracking data has implications for 
future research assessing mentalizing abilities. Some pre-
vious studies have investigated mentalizing abilities using 
eye-tracking data alone (Schuwerk et al. 2014; Senju et al. 
2009). However, our results demonstrate that poorer men-
talizing abilities associated with high levels of autistic traits 
are not always accompanied by atypical visual ixation pat-
terns. This is supported by previous research which showed 
that although adults with ASD spent less time ixating on 
the eyes of others, these atypical ixation patterns did not 
correlate with poorer mentalizing performances (Cassidy 
et al. 2013).
In conclusion, we found that adults with ASD were sig-
niicantly impaired at explicitly but not implicitly inferring 
the intentions of others from their hand actions. Although 
there was a trend for adults with high levels of autistic traits 
to display poorer implicit mentalizing performances, this 
relationship did not reach signiicance. The lack of a signii-
cant implicit mentalizing deicit may be due to subconscious 
processing of intentional information when intentions are 
portrayed by action kinematics. Adults with ASD displayed 
typical ixation patterns when both implicitly and explic-
itly inferring the intentions of others. The inconsistency we 
observed between impaired explicit mentalizing but typical 
ixation patterns suggests that reduced abilities to explicitly 
infer intentions from hand actions cannot be attributed to 
dissimilarities in ixation patterns. Our indings suggest that 
future research should consider the stimuli used and assess 
mentalizing abilities with both behavioural and eye-tracking 
techniques.
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